The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System is a large, complex, and understudied government-sponsored liquidity facility that currently has more than $1 trillion in secured loans outstanding, mostly to commercial banks and thrifts. In this paper, we document the significant role played by the FHLB System at the onset of the ongoing financial crises and then provide evidence on the uses of these funds by the System's bank and thrift members. Next, we identify the trade-offs faced by member-borrowers when choosing between accessing the FHLB System or the Federal Reserve's Discount Window during the crisis period. We conclude by describing the fragmented U.S. lender-of-last-resort framework and finding that additional clarity about the respective roles of the various liquidity facilities would be helpful.
Many of the very largest U.S. and European financial institutions were directly exposed to the subprime mortgage market through loans to subprime originators, investments in the senior tranches of subprime MBS, and retained tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs); the latter of which was largely secured by the subordinate tranches of subprime MBS.
These same institutions were also indirectly exposed through their sponsorship of structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and asset-backed commercial paper conduits (ABCP conduits), which purchased subprime MBS, as well as through exposures to their trading counterparties who in turn had similar problems.
The ratings action also triggered a loss of confidence by investors in a broad array of structured finance products. Related selling and hedging activity put additional downward pressure on the prices of a broad range of structured finance securities. Mark-to-market accounting rules, in turn, resulted in the recognition of large accounting losses and a material deterioration in capital positions for the exposed institutions. Uncertainty about the ultimate level of exposure faced by individual institutions prompted money market investors to reduce their exposure to any entity which might have exposure; thereby leading to a sharp increase in the cost and a significant reduction in the availability of term funding. This stress in term funding markets was key because the inability of institutions to access term credit --concurrent with the breakdown of the originate-to-distribute model of financial intermediation that left them with unexpected assets on their balance sheets --would impair the ability of these institutions to originate new credit and amplify the effect of the correction in the housing and mortgage markets.
Conventional wisdom holds that, when faced with such liquidity shocks, a governmentsponsored liquidity provider (e.g., the central bank) should be available to act as a lender of last resort.
1 Over the last year, the Federal Reserve has indeed played the role of a lender of last resort and has provided substantial amounts of liquidity to the financial system. However, at the outset of the liquidity crisis, the Federal Reserve saw little demand for primary credit through its Discount Window --even after lowering the discount rate from 100 basis points to 50 basis points above the Federal Funds target. 2 Some observers attributed the lack of Discount Window lending during this period to the notion of there being a 'stigma' to such borrowing insofar as it would send an adverse signal about the financial viability of the borrower. However, the lack of borrowing from the Discount Window can also be explained by the presence of an alternative, lower cost government-sponsored liquidity backstop: The Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLB) System.
The FHLB System is a large, complex, and understudied U.S. government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) that was created in the midst of the Great Depression. This housing GSE consists of 12 cooperatively owned wholesale banks that act as a general source of liquidity to 1 Frexias, Giannini, Haggarth, and Soussa (1999) define the role of the lender of last resort to be the discretionary provision of liquidity to in reaction to an adverse shock that causes an abnormal increase in the demand for liquidity not available from an alternative source. While history provides some examples of the lenders of last resort being private entities (e.g. clearing houses in the United States prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve) or even private individuals (J.P. Morgan in 1907), we consider the lender of last resort to be either part of the government or operating with explicit or implicit governmental backing. 2 The Discount Window is historically the principal mechanism through which the Federal Reserve performs its lender of last resort function. The Discount Window is considered to be a "Lombard Facility" -meaning that eligible depository institutions can freely access central bank credit at a penalty rate with appropriate collateral. The Discount Window began operating this way in 2003.
over 8,000 member financial institutions, which are commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions, and insurance companies. This liquidity is primarily provided through "advances" or (over) Second, we want to understand the interplay between the liquidity facilities provided by the FHLB System and the Federal Reserve, respectively. We do so by comparing quantities and prices. As a general reluctance to lend among private agents emerged at the outset of the crisis, the FHLB System became an attractive source of funding as investors placed a premium on the implicit government backing of their debt. Despite substantial cuts in the Federal Reserve's discount rate relative to the federal funds target, the FHLB System continued to see strong demand for advances through the end of 2007. However, following heightened concerns about the financial health of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the second quarter of 2008, the FHLB System found itself "guilty by association" and saw its borrowing costs and advance rates rise.
Hence, the Discount Window became a more attractive option in terms of pricing and saw some increase in borrowings.
Finally, we wish to draw insights and lessons from this episode in order to frame a discussion for how to think about the lender of last resort role in a modernized financial regulatory structure. While the Federal Reserve has eclipsed the FHLB System in terms of total lending during the crisis, the FHLB System has been the largest lender to U. Warga (1996, 2002) , Nothaft, Pearce, and Stevanovic (2002) , and Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005) . 10 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also maintain large volumes of credit guarantees on mortgage-backed securities. These guarantees (net of securities held on their own balance sheets) totaled $2.3 trillion (Fannie Mae) and $1.4 trillion (Freddie Mac) as of June 30, 2008. 11 Flannery and Frame (2006) identify and analyze FHLB System risk-taking incentives and compare them to those faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 12 The regulations currently applying to the FHLB System are those previously promulgated by the Federal Housing Finance Board. These regulations are codified at 12 C.F.R. § 900-999.
The stated public purpose of the FHLB System is to provide their members with financial products and services, most notably advances, to assist and enhance the members' financing of housing and community lending. 13 One important empirical question relates to what types of assets FHLB advances ultimately fund on member balance sheets. While members must post collateral to secure their advances and that collateral is typically residential mortgage-related (whole loans or mortgage-backed securities), money is fungible; there is no reason why the members would necessarily use the borrowed funds for further housing loans or other designated uses. Indeed, empirical evidence provided by Frame, Hancock, and Passmore (2007) suggests that FHLB advances are just as likely to fund other types of bank credit as to fund residential mortgages.
Another important question relates to whether the benefits of FHLB membership flow to members and, if so, whether it flows further still to consumers -especially mortgage borrowers.
In one study, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2004) 
The Role of FHLB Advances during the 2007 Liquidity Crisis
Advances are historically the primary activity conducted by the FHLBs. These loans are generally collateralized by residential mortgage-related assets (whole loans and mortgage-backed securities) and U.S. Treasury and Federal Agency securities. 14 Beyond the explicit collateral and a member's capital subscription, the FHLBs also have priority over the claims of depositors and almost all other creditors (including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or FDIC) in the event of a member's default; this is often described as a "super-lien." 15 Taken together, these features help to explain why none of the FHLBs has ever suffered a loss on an advance.
Unfortunately from a public policy perspective, the combination of over-collateralization and the super-lien can create an incentive for the FHLBs to provide their members with more credit than is socially optimal. This is due to the fact that these provisions reduce the FHLBs'
incentives to screen and monitor their members and the pledged collateral. This arrangement also serves to weaken the claims of existing private creditors and expose the FDIC to increased losses in the event of failure (Stojanovic, Vaughan and Yeager 2008) . Consistent with the potential for excessive lending, the FHFA (as previously established by the Federal Housing Finance Board) does not impose loan to one borrower limits on the FHLBs; and that individual FHLB internal limits (when imposed) are generally set in the range of 30 -50 percent of member total assets. By contrast, national banks limit loans to one borrower at 25 percent of bank total equity (with not more than 15 percent of bank equity being unsecured).
16
FHLB advances are generally viewed as an attractive source of wholesale funds.
Advance interest rates are set by the individual FHLBs and reflect a mark-up to the cost of Federal Agency debt funding secured by the Office of Finance. However, in order to receive an advance, a member must also purchase FHLB stock in an amount ranging from 2-6 percent of the advance (as dictated by the individual FHLB's capital plan). While FHLB stock typically pays a dividend, to the extent this pay-out falls below the members' marginal investment opportunity the stock purchase requirement can create an opportunity cost. Generally speaking,
there is an inverse relationship between advance rates and dividend rates across FHLBs; with differences presumably reflecting efficiencies and the collective preferences of the membership. During the second half of 2007, the ten most active members accounted for almost $150 billion of the $235 billion increase (63%). Table 3 shows that Washington Mutual, Bank of America, and Countrywide borrowed the largest amounts from the FHLB System during this period; and for Washington Mutual and Countrywide their ratios of advances-to-total assets rose to 20 and 40 percent, respectively.
As liquidity pressures developed during the fall of 2007, FHLB advances became an attractive source of funding in terms of pricing. During this time, investors sought the protection of (explicitly or implicitly) federally guaranteed obligations and FHLB funding costs declined relative to other benchmarks like LIBOR and AA-rated asset-backed commercial paper. For example, the average spread between one month LIBOR and four week FHLB discount notes increased from about 16 basis points prior to the turmoil to 44 basis points during the following 12 months. By contrast, the average spread between a 30-day advance from the FHLB New York and four week FHLB System discount notes has remained unchanged at about 25 basis points (see Figure 2) . 17 Discount notes are generally sold in sizes ranging from $500 million to over $5 billion each; with typical maturities being overnight, 4-, 9-, 13-, and 26-weeks.
Aggregate Balance Sheets
We start by aggregating the Call Reports of both commercial banks and thrifts over three time Table 4 documents the aggregate behavior of large and small depository institutions over the three time periods (Panels A-C). For each line item, the table reports the aggregate percentage of the item relative to total assets in the last quarter, the percentage change over the quarter, and the change in the ratio of the item to total assets measured in percentage points.
We begin our discussion focusing on the behavior of large institutions during the third quarter of 2007 (Panel B). Most striking is the 31.7% increase in FHLB advances compared to the average quarterly growth rate in this balance sheet item of 0.4% over the previous six quarters reported in Panel A. The overall increase in "other borrowing," of which FHLB advances are a part, more than offset a decline in federal funds and repo borrowing by large institutions. This suggests that FHLB advances were used, in part, to mitigate a funding shock.
While deposit growth was slow (2.1%) relative to growth in total assets (4.0%), it was slightly higher than the average deposit growth over the previous six quarters (1.8%). This suggests that funding pressures faced by large institutions were largely isolated to federal funds and repo borrowing. 18 The bank and thrift Call Reports do have some minor differences and we have worked to keep categories comparable and thereby minimize distortions.
On the asset-side, large institutions also reduced their cash holdings (relative to total assets) during the third quarter of 2007 -consistent with an increased demand for liquidity.
Asset growth during 2007:Q3 for these institutions largely came from federal funds and repo lending as well as trading assets. Large institutions also experienced a modest increase in total loans (3.4%), which was faster than the baseline average quarterly growth rate of 1.5% (Panel A). This acceleration largely came from non-mortgage loans. The increase in trading assets is consistent with large institutions using FHLB advances in order to fund mortgage loans in the securitization pipeline that were unexpectedly retained on the balance sheet due to the breakdown of the originate-to-distribute model.
One possible explanation for the increase in federal funds and repo lending during 2007:Q3 is that a number of institutions were granted exemptions from Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, which restricts lending to affiliates, in order to allow commercial banks to support their affiliated broker-dealers. 19 We investigated this explanation by comparing the increase in repo lending on the bank and thrift Call Reports with similar lending on the holding company's Y-9C, for the subset of U.S. institutions where such information is available. As lending from a bank to its affiliate would not appear on the consolidated balance sheet, this should provide indirect evidence on the importance of changes in inter-bank lending. The evidence suggests that this phenomenon only explained a small part of the increase in federal funds and repo lending. Hence it appears that large institutions were using FHLB advances to help fund assets more generally. In this way, the FHLBs appear to have been performing as a typical lender of last resort; providing liquidity to depository institutions that, in turn, provided liquidity more broadly to the rest of the economy.
The data in Panel B also documents a significant increase in FHLB advances during 2007:Q3 for small financial institutions, or those with less than $5 billion in total assets. This appears to largely have been to offset slow deposit growth (relative to the baseline period). The growth in the assets of small institutions (1.7%) was slightly below average over the previous six quarters. One interpretation of this fact is that funding pressure was constraining balance sheets, but another is that small institutions reduced their demand for funding as they tightened underwriting standards. The outright decline in cash and the acceleration in the growth of federal funds and repo borrowing would appear to support the former explanation. Moreover, it is interesting to note the significant decline in federal funds and repo lending, suggesting that small institutions were part of the investor class exiting secured funding markets. As reducing the level of inter-bank lending is cheaper than increasing the level of inter-bank borrowing, this is also consistent with small institutions facing funding pressures.
Panel C documents the aggregate behavior of banks and thrifts during the fourth quarter of 2007, with a similar format to the first two panels. While the asset growth of large institutions slowed to 2.6%, it remained above the mean growth rate of the six pre-crisis quarters. And the growth in FHLB borrowing by large institutions was only modestly faster than that of total assets. This faster growth in assets is largely explained by the same sources from the third quarter: federal funds and repo borrowing, trading assets, and non-mortgage loans. Small institutions appeared to be under continued pressure in the fourth quarter, as deposit growth was slow relative to pre-crisis averages, federal funds and repo borrowing as well as FHLB borrowing expanded quickly, and federal funds and repo lending continued to contract.
Overall, the aggregate data suggest that both large and small institutions used FHLB advances during the second half of 2007 in order to smooth a liquidity shock. However, large institutions also used advances to fund increases in the trading book, federal funds and repo lending, and non-mortgage lending.
Regression Analysis
So far, our approach has been descriptive, but now we turn to some statistical analysis. In The first column in Table 5 documents the "normal" relationship between FHLB advances and the various balance sheet categories for the six quarters before the crisis. While advances are correlated with federal funds and repo lending for small institutions (Line 4) with an estimated coefficient of 0.385 (significant at the 1% level), the correlation for large institutions is close to zero with an estimated implicit coefficient of 0.385+(-0.317) = 0.068.
There is a strong correlation between FHLB advances and both mortgage loans and nonmortgage loans for small institutions, but a much weaker one for large ones. Finally, small banks and thrifts appear to use FHLB advances to smooth changes in funding, while large institutions are less dependent on advances for this purpose.
The second column of Table 5 to term funding was constraining the ability of institutions to originate loans, one might expect these elevated correlations to persist. In other words, they would have simply continued to access term funding from the FHLB System. This suggests that FHLB advances were used to smooth a large one-time shock; and that the willingness of banks to lend --and not term funding pressure -subsequently became the binding constraint on the origination of new loans. One explanation for the lack of Discount Window borrowing is the perception by potential borrowers that markets will view such borrowing very unfavorably. In other words, that there is a "stigma" associated with borrowing from the Discount Window. 23 Figure 5 illustrates this point by documenting the fraction of days in each month where the intraday high in the Federal Funds market (as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) is above the 21 Primary credit is available to depository institutions in sound overall condition to meet short-term, backup funding needs at a price above the federal funds rate target. Normally, primary credit will be granted on a "no-questionsasked," minimally administered basis. There are no restrictions on borrowers' use of primary credit. 22 Guerrerain (2007) reported that Deutsche Bank borrowed from the discount window on the day of the teleconference. The following Wednesday, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wachovia, and Citibank also each announced discount window borrowings of $500 million, including some on a term basis (Associated Press, 2007) . While stigma is a compelling explanation of the data, the unwillingness of institutions to borrow from the Federal Reserve at the outset of the crisis can also be explained by the simple fact that FHLB advances have been a less expensive option for domestic depository institutions.
Crisis-Related Lending by the Federal Reserve and the FHLB System
The relative attractiveness of the Federal Reserve's Discount Window vis-à-vis the FHLB system is, for the most part, driven by the spread between the primary credit rate and the short term advance rate. However, differences in the haircuts applied across types of collateral, stock purchase requirements (and the associated dividends), and interest rate expectations all influence the cost of borrowing. In order to better understand the limited effect of FHLB advances on the LIBOR-OIS interest rate spread, it is insightful to look at the panel of 16 banking organizations that are surveyed to measure U.S. term dollar LIBOR. 25 Table 6 lists these banking organizations s and indicates whether they have access to FHLB advances and/or the Federal Reserve's discount window. In the table, a banking organization is defined to have "direct access" to the FHLB System if it controls a U.S. depository institution that is a FHLB member and that institution is large relative to the banking organization. A banking organization is defined to have "indirect access" if it controls a U.S. depository institution that is a FHLB member, but that member is small relative to the banking organization. In practice, this excludes all foreign institutions which control a U.S.-based FHLB-member bank since the size of their U.S. operations is small were reporting paying about 4.00 basis points less for unsecured funding than banks without such access (see Figure 8) . The bottom line is that access to liquidity from the FHLB System may have affected the LIBOR quotes received by member banking organizations, especially when the market was under stress. One possible explanation is that banks were more willing to lend (or willing to lend at a lower rate) if the borrowing institution had access to a "stigma free"
quasi-government liquidity backstop; thereby increasing the likelihood that the borrower would be able to return the money even in adverse conditions.
While access to FHLB advances is limited among the LIBOR panel contributors, Table 6 also illustrates that access to the Federal Reserve's Discount Window is universal among this In sum, the purpose of the TAF and swap lines was to increase U.S. dollar liquidity.
However, the early evidence concerning the effectiveness is conflicting. 26 Taylor and Williams (2008) find that the daily LIBOR-OIS spreads (1-month and 3-month) are unaffected on TAF bid submission dates. By contrast, Wu (2008) The introduction of the TAF and swap lines also had important implications for the relative attractiveness of FHLB advances as most FHLB members are eligible for the TAF. (according to our measure). During the following months, the Discount Window became more attractive from a pricing perspective (see Figure 6 ). An important reason for this was a negative 
Conclusion
The ongoing global financial crisis has provided an opportunity to learn about the roles of many often-overlooked financial institutions and financial markets. The often-overlooked FHLB System was one of the first institutions to emerge as an important provider of governmentsponsored liquidity. Indeed, it was about eight months into the crisis before the Federal Reserve eclipsed the FHLB System in terms of crisis-related lending to the financial system. FFR: Federal funds rate target, θ: Capital stock purchase activity requirement (4.5 percent), DIV:
Dividend rate (6.0 percent).
For illustrative purposes, in Table A1 below, we compute the all-in cost measures using data from September 11, 2007. We focus on a AAA-rated Federal Agency mortgage-backed security with a market value of $1 million that needs to be financed for one month. The all-in cost at the FHLB New York was 5.08 percent compared to the lending rate at 5.01 percent -a difference of seven basis points. At the time the primary credit rate stood at 5.75 but less than a week later the federal funds rate target was lowered by 50 basis points. The OIS indicated that the federal funds rate, on average, would be 34 basis points lower over the next month. Hence, the all-in expected cost of the discount window was 5.41 percent implying a spread in all-in costs between FHLB New York and the discount window of 33 basis points in favor of FHLB New York. 15. R-squared 0.38 0.48 0.42 Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
